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An Analysis
Of the Conflict
By Charles E. Cobb, Jr.
After years of strugg Ie against a brutal
colonial system, Angola finally gained its
independence a few months ago. The
road to nationhood for Portugal's last
colony in Africa was tough and ridden
with much heralded bloody encounters
among the various factions in the Angolan
conflict.
LikeVietnam before it,Angola's struggle
for national liberation constitutes a focal
point of an international conflict involving
power, politics and economics. In part, it
represents a major clash of world views.
Here, a brief history is in order.
In mid-1950s, much of the colonial
world was in the process of decolonizing.
Much of Africa was in the beginning
stages of political struggle that would
lead to a burst of independence in the
1960s. The Vietnamese had defeated the
French; China was consolidating its hard
won independence, armed struggle was
beginning in Algeria; and stirrings of a
new phase of Black struggle here in the
United States could be felt.
Angola was not isolated from these
"winds ofchange." Relatively unorganized
pol itical ferment and pressure for reform
had begun there. Some of the rootsof this
ferment lie in what conditions in Portugal
- then a fascist state- had produced.
Poverty in Portugal accelerated migra-
tion to Angola in the post World War Two
period, heightening in Angola, already
existing European-African land and labor
tensions.
The post war period also saw the devel-
opment of a "Luso-tropical" notion. This
idea defined Angola, Mozambique, and
Guinea-Bissau as part of a greater Portu-
gal with all inhabitants being Portuguese.
This intensified the importance of various
class and caste categories:
"Assimilado"-a tiny minority of edu-
cated Africans given legal status that
enabled them to enter into professions;
"Mestico"-offspring of Africans and
Europeans, usually African women and
European men; 1
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WORLD WIDE PHOTOS
THE U. S. INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA
By Courtland Cox
The internal struggle in Angola has a
relatively long history. The long standing
differences between the leaders of the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA) and the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) are both
ideological and personal. As far back as
1964, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) tried to mediate the differences
between the two factions, but gave up in
1966 without success.
Given the long and bitter ideological
and personality differences between
NFLA head Holden Roberto and MPLA
head Agostinho Neto, it should not be too
surprising to see them opposing each
other in the Angolan conflict.
The American Role
The United States played a dual role in
Angola from 1961 to 1969. It supplied
Portugal's military needs for the colonial
wars in Africa; at the same time, hedged
its bets in Angola .by supporting FNLA
with funds for political and logistical
purposes.
Ostensibly, the United States sold
millions of dollars in arms- including
bombs, napalm, munitions-to Portugal
for NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion) purposes. However, during hearings
by Congressman Charles Diggs (0-
Mich.) in March, 1973, it was revealed
that the United States had indeed con-
tributed to the prosecution of the counter-
insurgency warfare in Angola, Mozam-
bique and Guinea-Bissau.
Also, the United States subsidized-at
a much reduced level-Holden Roberto's
FNLA through Zaire and CIA conduits
from 1961 to 1969. (New York Times,
September 23, 1975). But, in 1969, the
Nixon administration decided to end the
covert aid program to FNLA as a part of
policy decision to improve relations with
the white regimes in Southern Africa.
(According to State Department aides at
a hearing before the Subcommittee on
Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, February 5, 1976, the CIA kept
Roberto on the payroll [reportedly at a
sum of $10,000 annually] as an intelli-
gence source).
In January, 1975, when it became clear
that Angola would receive its independ-
ence, this time the Ford administration
turned Roberto back on by granting him a
surn of $300,000. According to testimony
by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
before the Senate Subcommittee on
Africa, January 29, 1976, the funds were
given to Roberto for the purchase of
supplies and bicycles.
In the early spring of 1975, President
Gerald Ford made the decision to also
fund the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola [UNITAl, which
was founded in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi.
The 40 Committee-a body in the Execu-
tive branch that approves large scale
covert operations (chaired by Kissinger),
approved $300,000 in secret subsidies
for UNITA. Both President Ford and Sec-
retary Kissinger were aware that bring ing
UNITA to the American side constituted
a major step-close to a commitment that
the United States would not allow MPLA
to control Angola.
An official of the Ford administration
told John Marks, an associate at the
Center for National Security Studies,
that Kissinger pushed hard for increased
CIA intervention. "Henry wanted to be
told why we should intervene," said the
official, "not why not." (Intelligence
Report, Vol. 1, No.1, December 1975).
Many within the State Department were
Continued on Page 40
Before Independence-MPLA's Agostinho Neto,
(left) who now heads the Government of the People's
Republic of Angola, is seen here with FNLA's Holden
Roberto (center) and UNITA's Jonas Savimbi during
January 1975 unity talks in Mombasa, Kenya.
"European" - the ru lers; 5
"African"-minimally, 95 percent of
the population of Angola, oppressed,
exploited, and angry.
In 1954, the Bakongo tribe of Northern
Angola chose Holden Roberto as its new
chief in a secession quarrel that was tied
up with reform issues and Catholic-Prot-
estant religious conflict. What Roberto
stood for at this point was separation of
the Bakongo from Angola, and tribal self-
determination through the reestablishment
of the old "Bakongo Empire" of the 15th
Century, which stretched between Angola
and what is now Zaire. The organization
formed for this purpose was UPNA-the
Popular Union of Northern Angola.
During this same period, men like
Agostinho Neto, Marcelino Dos Santos,
and Amilcar Cabral, all "assimilado"
from Portugal's African colonies, were
returning to Africa after university educa-
tion and political involvement in. the
Portuguese left.
Neto, who returned to Luanda, had
already been jailed in Portugal for his
militant anti-fascist poetry. As a gynecolo-
gist, he set up practice in Luanda's slums,
but also maintained political commitment,
becoming involved in the formation of the
MPLA-the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola- in 1956. This move-
ment at this time was primarily urban-
based and different from UPNA in its
non-tribal orientation as well as in its
leadership which, while "nationalist," was
also pol itically leftwing - borrowing much,
though not blindly, from Marx and Lenin.
At the persuasion of a number of African
leaders attend ing the 1958 All African
.Peoples Conference in Ghana, Roberto
dropped the "N" from UPNA and rede-
fined the movement as a movement for
national liberation. UPA, however, never
lost its tribal image or its hostility to the
"urban elites" of MPLA. In political terms
this translated into an anti-communist
hostility-communism being the rather
inaccurate view by UPA of MPLA's objec-
tives. Though ill-defined politically, UPA's 2
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6 In July 1964, Jonas Savimbi
who [in 1966] was to form
UNITA - the National Union
for the Total Independence
of Angola - in breaking with
UPA, was to tell the OAU
(Organization of African
Unity) that UPA was an
American creation aimed at
splitting Angolan nationalists
and assuring that if decoloni-
zation did occur, neo-
colonial relations would
be maintained.
hostility was rightly placed in the sense
that MPLA was for the elimination of the
kinds of feudal remnants reflected in
UPA's desires for a new ancient "empire."
In the north, in Bakongoland, and in
Luanda, there were sporadic political
protests partly spurred by events in
neighboring Congo Kinshasa (nowZaire).
In February 1961, there was an MPLA-Ied
uprising in Luanda, basically. a failure,
certainly a military failure. A month
later, there was a UPA uprising in the
north. Both triggered massive Portuguese
repression.
Inside MPLA, the Luanda uprising
intensified an already begun debate over
strategy and goals. This debate was
handicapped by the fact that a significant
part of the MPLA leadership was in jail-
Neto included.
UPAwas in a better military position to
fight in a heavily forested area of Angola,
and won political and financial support
from some African states through the
efforts of Frantz Fanon-and interestingly,
from theKennedyadministration.Although
Fanon felt closer politically to MPLA, he
believed that UPAwas ready to start fight-
ing immediately. In his view, at least at the
time, it was most important for fighting to
begin which would act to define a revolu-
tionary movement. The Kennedy adminis-
tration on the other hand, while having a
basic commitment to Portuguese coloni-
alism, especially in terms of NATO-North
Atlantic Treaty Organization- interests,
felt it necessary to provide support for
UPA.
The OAU Connection
In July 1964,Jonas Savimbi who [in 1966]
was to form UNITA-the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola- in
breaking with UPA, was to tell the OAU
(Organization of African Unity) that UPA
was an American creation aimed at split-
ting Angolan nationalists and assuring
that if decolonization did occur, neo-
colonial relations would be maintained.
Nevertheless, in 1961, despite contra-
dictions, UPA had the appearance of a
potentially effective national movement;
while MPLAwas caught up in internal de-
bate. Events in Congo Kinshasa assisted
Roberto's UPA. Patrice Lumumba was
assassinated and Roberto was able to
parlay tribal kinship into close ties with
one of the contending factions there: the
Cyri lieAbdou la.Joseph Kasavubu.Joseph
Mobutu faction, which was America's fac-
tion. A right-wing government in next-door
Congo Brazzaville was another assist.
MPLA also in Congo Kinshasa was very
much a political pariah.
When theOAUwas formed in 1963,UPA
which had by now formed an official fight-
ingwing called FNLA-the National Front·
for the Liberation of Angola-also formed
a government, GRAE-Revolutionary An-
golan Govemment in Exile. With this, they
convinced the OAU Liberation Committee
that they were the sole representative of
the Angolan people. The Abdoula regime
expelled MPLA from Congo Kinshasa.
Agostinho Neto had escaped prison in
1962 and was trying to rebuild MPLA.
Despite problems in Congo Kinshasa, a
coup in Congo Brazzaville in 1964moved
that country leftward and enabled MPLA
to establ ish a base there. That same year,
Zambia became independent and MPLA
was able to locate there also. From Braz-
zaville, MPLA had access to Cabinda
Province; from Zambia, it had access to
Angola's eastern zone.
That sameyear (1964),yet another coup
in Congo Kinshasa established Moise
Tshombe as prime minister. Tshombe had
led the Katanga Province secession
attempt and had received support from
Portugal and SouthAfrica. He returned the
favor by closing the boundary to UPA-
FNLA-GRAE.This collapsed the already
shaky organization so far as military
activity was concerned.
As mentioned earlier, Savimbi in 1964
broke with UPA-FNLA-GRAEand created
UNITA in 1966. And, according to one
Portuguese official, Portugal looked with
favor on this development in the hopes
that the same kinds of conflicts that char-
acterized FNLA-MPLA relations would
develop and continue to disrupt the devel-
ment of a unified national liberation
movement. There is no hard evidence that
UNITA was "created" by the Portuguese.
Though conflicts continued both inter-
nally and with the rival movements,MPLA
managed from the latter part of 1964 to
maintain fairly consistent guerrilla warfare,
helped by its close political ties to the
stronger movements of PAIGC in Guinea-
Bissau (its head, assassinated by the
Portuguese shortly before independence,
was Amilcar Cabral who was also one of
the founders of MPLA) and FRELIMO in
Mozambique. MPLAwas handicapped by
the fact that unlike PAIGCwith a strongly
committed Republic of Guinea neighbor-
ing Bissau, and Mozambique with an
equally as committed Tanzania on its
border supporting FRELlMO,Angola had
a hostile Congo Kinshasa then being run
by Mobutu in 1965, and a wishy-washy
Zambia to the east fearful of its copper
routes through Angola being disrupted.
Meanwhile, Savimbi, after having
broken with Roberto's UPA-FNLA-GRAE
organization (Savimbi was foreign minis-
ter of GRAE)over that organization's lack
of fighting, and the tribalistic content of
its politics, went to Cairo and then spent
a year in Switzerland, where he had done3
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most of his college education. During this
period, he also went to China, and to
Congo Brazzaville, where he held discus-
sions with Neto and MPLA
Although Savimbi proclaimed aMarxist-
Leninist line with Chinese orientation, in
1963 he blocked the admission into GRAE
of Viriato da Cruz, who had broken with
the MPLA and who had good relations
with the Chinese. This appears to be part
of a power strugg Ie between the two men
for leadership of the left factions within
MPLAandFNLA.Forapparently.Savirnbi's
main reason for not coming into MPLA
after his break with Roberto,was his belief
that Neto's politics was "revisionist." Neto,
for his part, seems to have considered
Savimbi an unstable ultra leftist.
On March 19,1966 UNITAwas formed
and almost immediately began armed
struggle. UNITA also called for a united
front against the Portuguese,which MPLA
did not consider serious in light of
Savimbi's refusal to come into MPLA
.before forming UNITA. The FNLA for its
part insisted that UNITAdissolve, and that
Savimbi write a letter of apology for his
denunciation of Roberto in 1964.
UNITA's fighting was on a front south
of Luso in Angola and along the Zambian
border. Though small in scope, it was
consistent.
Zambia's independence also helped
UNITA in establishing an extemal base
there. But UNITA was expelled in 1967
following accusations by the Portuguese
that it had blown up sections of the vital
Benguela raiIroad,and Portuguesethreats
to cut rail line access to Zambia unless
action was taken. Also, since MPLA was
on good terms with Zambia's ruling party,
UNITA found itself allying with the Zam-
bian opposition in Lozi Province which
borders Angola.
Kicked out of Zambia, UNITA found it-
self without means to receive material
support and consequently its fighting
effort suffered. By 1970, the small amount
of support from the Chinese had virtually
vanished, and Portuguese military bulle-
tins didn't even mention UNITA.Also, like
MPLA, the organization was hampered by
internal differences, specifically in
UNITA's case, differences between the
regional commissioners of peasant origin
and the political commisioners of urban
origin. These intemal conflicts dovetailed
with an MPLA drive into eastern Angola
which sparked clashes between MPLA
and UNITA.
Consequently, while UNITA was in
Angola fighting and organizing, itcouldn't
convince anybody that it existed.
In 1972, MPLA attempted to enter into
a military alliance with FNLA in the hopes
that the Zaire border would become open
to its forces, and also because there was
political debate inside MPLA over the
necessity of at least operational unity with
other Angolan movements. Part of the
pressure was also coming from inde-
pendent African states, most of whom
were pledging (at OAU Conference in
Morocco), to downplay political differ-
ences among independent African states
in the interests of advancing the liberation
of Southern Africa. The clearest sign of
this effort was in Tanzania's swallowing
its misgivings about Mobutu's role in the
Lumumba murder and warming up its
relations with Zaire.
One account has it that the internal
MPLA debates were serious enough to
disrupt the Angola fighting, enough for
Portugal to begin shifting troops to Mo-
zambique. As this report has it, Tanzania
and Zambia were concerned enough
about this to ask the Chinese to provide
military support to FNLA in the hopes that
they wouId add to the fighting - thus keep-
ing the troops in Angola. China, at any
rate, was giving some support to UNITA
in southernAngola.
There was in 1973 an apparent shift of
support away from Neto by both Tan-
zania and Zambia, and the Soviet Union,
toward Daniel Chipenda. Chipenda, how-
ever, lacked the internal support inside
MPLA and support swung back to Neto.
The Chipenda-Neto break became final
It is most important to
mention at this juncture that
the United States had more
than just a passive involve-
ment and concern with these
events. First, the implications
of independence for this area
of Africa were viewed with
much more interest than in
other areas of Africa. In trade
and investments, from Zaire
to Africa's southern tip,
billions of dollars were and
are there. The area's potential
in terms of raw material was,
and is, of major significance;
and the potential for capital
investment crucial to the
financial and industrial
complex that runs the United
States. The U. S. strategy for
the region had two prongs:
1) moderate African buffer .
states around the white-ruled
states; 2) the permanence of
white rule in the Southern
region.
with an attempt to assassinate Neto, and
Chipenda fled to FNLA with a portion of
MPLA's eastern mi litary force. And it was
Chipenda who was one of the major links
in the relationship established last year
among UNITA,FNLA,and South Africa.
The American Connection
It is most important to mention at this
juncture that the United States had more
than just a passive involvement and con-
cern with these events. First, the implica-
tions of independence for this area of
Africa were viewed with much more in-
terest than in other areas of Africa. In
trade and investments, from Zaire to
7
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8 Independence was now
inevitable in the near future.
In American policy-making
circles, comfortable assur-
ance of permanent white rule
in Southern Africa crumpled,
and the major question
became what kind of African
government. Similar concern
existed about Portugal itself
in relation to the "Atlantic
Alliance" and Southern
Europe.
Africa's southern tip, billions of dollars
were and are there. The area's potential
in terms of raw material was, and is, of
major significance; and the potential for
capital investment crucial to the financial
and industrial complex that runs the
United States. The U.S. strategy for the
region had two prongs: 1) moderate
African buffer states around the white-
ruled states; 2) the permanence of white
rule in the Southern region.
The pol itical map of independent Africa,
and particularly the experience in Congo
Kinshasa in the earlY'1960s, gave assur-
ance that the kinds of political units which
would be fraternal at least to capitalism,
could be cultivated. Despite the pressure
of guerrilla movements in Angola, Mo-
zambique, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) Nami-
bia, (SouthWest Africa) and South Africa,
white rule seemed permanent for the for-
seeable future. Indeed, a review of South-
ern Africa policy ordered by then National
Security Affairs' Henry Kissinger in 1969
which posed the assumption that armed
political struggle by Africans could not
win, was accepted, and not changed until
1974.
What changed White House opinion
was the Portuguese coup of Apri 11974.As
in Vietnam, the United States had made a
serious error in attempting to gauge the
potential of armed political warfare in
strictly military terms. The U.S. had
counted the forces of MPLA, UNITA,and
even FNLA and came up with less men
and material than the Portuguese had,
and therefore concluded there was no
prospect for an African victory.
Nevertheless, for all the difficulties,
Portugal was faced with wars of major
proportions thousands of miles away on
three separate fronts, the fronts them-
seIvesthousands ofmiles apart. Portugal's
rulers tried to argue that the wars were in
the national interest, but as casualties
mounted into the thousands among Por-
tugal's young men to protect a colonial
exploitation that benefited only Portugal's
own ruling elite, the wars had the effect
of heightening the contradictions within
Portugal.
Through contact with both the Portu-
guese left and the African movements,
younger officers began to identify the
aspirations of the African movements
with their own aspiration of seeing Portu-
gal free of fascist dictatorship. In this
respect, the underground among Portu-
guese that both FRELIMOin Mozambique
and the MPLA had, were crucial points
of contact in the flow of political ideas.
As the African wars increasingly wreaked
havoc on Portugal's economy and killed
off or chased away much manpower, the
regime fell, and the SouthernAfrica equa-
tion changed.
Independence was now inevitable in
the near future. In American policy-mak-
ing circles, comfortable assurance of
permanent white rule in Southern Africa
crumpled, and the major question be-
came what kind of African government.
Similar concern existed about Portugal
itself in relation to the "Atlantic Alliance"
and Southern Europe.
These concerns were intensified by
the pending defeat in Vietnam, other set-
backs in Europe, and post-Watergate
domestic pressures that ranged from
challenges to the illegal use of the C.IA
to Congressional challenges to the per-
sonalization of foreign pol icy bySecretary
of StateHenryKissinger, the latter sparked
by the Midd Ie East and Cyprus.
For Angola, however, the key date is
January 1975. On January 15, the Portu-
guese government and Angola's three
movements signed an agreement setting
Angola's independence for November 11 ,
1975. At just about the same time, the 40
Committee which coordinates U.S. in-
telligence voted $300,000 for Roberto's
FNLA. Secretary Kissinger (chairman of
the 40 Committee) told the SenateForeign
Relations Committee recently that the
money was for "office suppl ies." The
amount of money was actually small rela-
tive to America's capacity, but almost
30 times what Roberto had been getting
as a C.IA retainer; and dramatically visi-
ble within the Angola context. Interest-
ingly, the C.l.A. wasn't completely sold
on the idea: Its reluctance apparently
based on its assessment of Roberto. The
C.IA was more interested in UNITA, but
UNITA's strength (political) and potential
was relatively unknown.
The significance of the 40 Committee
decision lies in the fact that Angola's
movements had already agreed to a coali-
tion, albeit uneasy. And, though MPLA
had for more than a decade been getting
support from the Soviets and other so-
cialist countries, the question ofamassive
Soviet presence was not a factor. Kissin-
ger's own African experts-whom he
ignored-saw Iittle if any chance ofAngola
becoming a "Soviet satellite."
The decision harks back to 1960, 1961
and 1965-to the Congo Kinshasa con-
flict. In the Congo of Lumumba, the United
States felt threatened by agenuine African
nationalism, and with alternative political
units (African) eliminated Lumumba and
cuItivated a takeover by someonemore re-
sponsive to American interests. This was
achieved by 1965 with Mobutu's ascend-
ency. Like in Angola, great wealth was at
stake.
Kissinger's need in Angola was made
especially urgent in his mind because so
much of the apparatus of his tenure in
5
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American foreign policy-making was dis-
integrating around the world. At the meet-
ing in January, a decision was made to
encourage Zaire's intervention in Angola
-a decision made more significant by a
proposed increase in military aid to Zaire
from $4 million in 1975 to $19.9 million
in 1976; and a total increase in aid to
Zaire during the same period of from $9.3
million to $64.5 million.
One thing emerges clearly. Contrary
to Kissinger's Senate testimony in Jan-
uary 1976, the $300,000was not to "stale-
mate" an escalated Soviet or Cuban "in-
tervention," but was to establish FNLA
dominance, and perhaps was deliberately
designed to shatter the tentative effort at
a coalition. The money certainly sparked
a series of FNLA-MPLA armed conflicts
throughout the summer of 1975. It also
guaranteed an escalated Soviet involve-
ment. Again in the area of speculation,
it's entirely possible that Kissinger saw
it not only in terms of a regional strategy
for Southern Africa, but also as a means
of testing what latitude he had still re-
maining in light of recent restraints im-
posed by the Congress. Here, there is a
striking resemblance to the Tonkin Gulf.
For the U.S. administration in April
1975, another traumatic disaster occurs.
Saigon falls and becomes Ho Chi Minh
City. In May, in a burst of Macho, the May-
aguet raids occur, and Kissinger and
Ford are apparently encouraged by
general acceptance on Capitol Hill, in
the press, and by the public.
The ante was upped in Angola in June.
The C.l.A proposed $30 million for FNLA.
In July, at least $14 million was approved
for FNLA and UNITA; and another $15
million for Zaire and Zambia-to aid the
two movements. These figures were
leaked by the Ford administration, ap-
parently in an effort to win public support
for the covert operation.
Certain members of the Senate were
briefed by C.IA Director William Colby,
Senator John Sparkman (D-Ala.) for in-
stance, but the information was not really
passed on. The Congressional storm
actually broke when Senate Africa Sub-
committee Chairman Dick Clark (D-Iowa)
discovered the growing U.S. involvement
in Angola while visiting Zaire.
Meanwhile, in Angola, although the
MPLA had successfully met the FNLA
challenge in Luanda, driving Roberto's
men out of the city, and driving UNITA
out, it was losing in the countryside.
An important question occurs here.The
main confl ict was between FNLA and
MPLA. UNITA adopted a stance of neu-
trality, which from the MPLA point of view,
acted to assist America's attempted take-
overthrough its FNLAproxy.This, coupled
with deep and long-standing suspicion
of UNITA, led to the abandonment of any
attempt to work out at least an operational
relationship. This was in fact what the
UPA-FNLA-GRAE had done to MPLA in
the middle 1960s.
The consequence was to push UNITA
formally into the FNLA camp. Would it
have been better for there to have been
an MPLA-UNITA alliance? Probably,
certainly in a tactical sense. Politically,
the distance between MPLA and UNITA
was not that far - not as far as the distance
between FNLA and UNITA,as the earlier
conflicts between the two factions reflect.
However, since this is not an academic
question, it is largely unanswerable from
outside of the conflict's own pressure.
The MPLA conflict was not determined
by a summer's events, but by a decade's.
In essence, the summer break between
MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA was political,
with MPLA viewing a just-about-to-be-
independent Angola already under as-
sault by imperialism, whose agent was
FNLA; and UNITA increasing Angola's
vulnerability either consciously or by
opting out in the name of "unity." An as-
sessment of MPLA's choice to push away
UNITA would have to be weighed care-
fully to determine how much was ideo-
logical and how much of it was the taking
advantage of a tactical opportunity. Its
appearance is that ideological differ-
MPLA soon found itself faced
with fighting on two fronts;
UNITA in the south, and FNLA,
in the north. It's at this
moment that MPLA began to
get the dramatic increase in
Soviet aid, and manpower
support from Cuba. The
context in which this support
arrives escalates support for
FNLA and UNITA from the
United States, and the
entrance of South Africa into
the conflict.
9
ences were secondary to what was seen
as the tactical advantage within the
Luanda context.
The Soviet-Cuban Connection
MPLA soon found itself faced with fight-
ing on two fronts; UNITA in the south, and
FNLA in the north..It's at this moment that
MPLA began to get the dramatic increase
in Soviet aid, and manpower support
from Cuba. The context in which" this
support arrives escalates support for
FNLA and UNITA from the United States,
and the entrance of South Africa into the
conflict.
Senator John Tunney (D-Cal.) told the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
February 1976, that, in October 1975
Savimbi received-through President
Mobutu of Zaire-van explicit commitment
of U.S. military aid. Two months earlier,
South African troops occupied a border
strip inside Angola near the Namibian
border. In the north, Zaire committed four
to five battal ions of about 12,000men to
fight with FNLA. Daniel Chipenda, who
earlier broke away from MPLA, formed a
mercenary unit inside Namibia, and was
beginning a thrust into Angola by mid-
October. Behind that unit were UNITA
troops who occupied the towns taken.
Continued on Page 38
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38 been more destructive to the progress of
Blacks than 1975. Though it can be ar-
gured with complete justification that
other Americans also sustained losses
during the year, Blacks lost more and
every loss represented a major set-
back from which it will take them years to
recover.
The hour is late. But there is sti II time to
set the house in order. 0
An Analysis of the Conflict
(Continued from Page 9)
An aide to SenatorTunneywho metwith
Savimbi in Silvo Porto told me that Sa-
vimbi acknowledged direct South African
assistance.
By Novemb-er 11, Angolan independ-
ence day, a formal FNLA-UNITAalliance
had been formed, with a capital at Nova
Lisboa, now called "Huambo," and FNLA
forces were just 10 miles north of Luanda
whi Ie UNITA forces, apparently spear-
headed by the "Chipenda Brigade," were
about 150miles south of Luanda.
At no time during these FNLA-UNITA
successes-as far as is known-did the
United States approach the Soviet Union
to discuss a de-escalation. There were
press accounts of the growth of Soviet
assistance, and of the growing South
African-American assistance. However,
the U.S. felt its clients would win. They
were in fact winning at the time.
South Africa's presence grew as Con-
gressional objections to covert U.S. aid
intensifed. By November 15, there were
at least two South African units of ap-
proximately 2000 men in Angola, ac-
companied by Allouette helicopters,
French and American tanks. Additionally,
mercenary units organized by Chipenda
were being supplied from Namibia by
South African C-130 aircraft. By the end
of November, there were almost 6000
regular South African troops as far as
SiIvaPorto inAngola's center. Everymajor
victory by the FNLA-UNITA forces re-
sulted from the SouthAfrican involvement.
It's within this context that the massive
Cuban involvement begins, and with it,
the squeals from the Ford administration.
In a political sense, Angola's civil war
had been transformed into a war against
external invasion. In an operational sense,
the war was not a guerri lla war, but a con-
ventional one. Nowhere is this more
evident that in the contingency alert
orders given to the U.S.Sixth Fleet. Spe-
cifically, the carrier Independence and
the guided missile cruiser Boston were
instructed to be ready to fly tactical air
support strikes over Angola.
Additionally, in November, spotter
planes believed to belong to the U.S.
flew missions over Angola from Zaire,
and cargo planes dropped supplies to
South African troops in central Angola-
flying from a Zaire base shared with
South African aircraft.
But there were two factors that allowed
the beseiged MPLA to turn the situation
around: 1) Political pressure in the United
States.An alarmed Congress with visions
of another Vietnam-type debacle halted
the flow of covert money. [All of the rea-
sons for this success can't be explored
here, but it is sufficient to say that the
reasons had less to do with sympathy
for MPLA than with a broader conflict
between Congress and the Ford admin-
istration over the procedure and conduct
of foreign policy. The challenges came
from both the left and the right.] 2) MPLA's
stance was boosted by Cuban-Soviet
assistance. In late October, the Cubans
began a massive airlift of troops, and the
Soviets began providing sophisticated
weapons. Intelligence sources have put
the estimated cost of the operation at
$200 million, but as Senator Tunney
pointed out, some $120 million was the
cost of logistical support such as trans-
portation to Angola. The value of actual
equipment was about $80 million.
As far as the Cuban support is con-
cerned, the decision seems to have
grown out of political support for MPLA
and a long relationship with the move-
ment. As for the Soviets, certainly they
seek to generate influence in Africa, and
see MPLA as a potentially important ally.
TheSoviet role is complex, and not always
principled (as in the case of flip-flopping
support for Chipenda and Neto, or the
intrusion of Sino-Soviet conflicts in their
dec ision-making).
The important qualitative difference
between Soviet-Cuban involvement and
South African involvement is: MPLA ad-
mits it asked the Soviets and Cubans in; 7
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UNITA and FNLA consistently deny ask-
ing in the South Africans. Thus, if there
is a criticism of the Soviet-Cuban pres-
ence, that criticism must be focused at
MPLA. South Africa, if one accepts the
UNITA-FNLAposition, is clearly an invad-
ing force. And arguing that UNITA does
not have the capacity to take on the South
Africans does not alter the difference in
South Africa's presence as compared to
the Cuban presence.
Between December 1975 and February
1976, the combined MPLA-Cuban effort
clearly defeated South Africa-an im-
portant victory for Africa.
The Road Ahead
Now, the question is whether MPLA can
tum military victory into an effective na-
tional political consolidation. This is
more difficult than the military conflict,
despite outward signs of breakthroughs
such as recognition by OAU and the rec-
onciliation with Zaire, and possibly with
Zambia, and overtures to the United
States.
The answer tums, in part, on MPLA's
own political dynamic. In 1973 and 1974
- even as the first effort at inter-movement
coalition was being attempted-MPLA
was in the midst of internal debate. There
were at one point in 1974, at least three
separate MPLA factions (one being the
Chipenda group). These rivalries and
political debates, in part, reflected ques-
tioning of the Neto leadership growing
out of frustration with both the tactic of
fighting and political organization. Some
of the specific focuses of the debates
were strengthening collective decision-
making, the question of coordinating
with UNITA-which was fighting a limited
but successful struggle in the south-and
how to deal with Angola's ethnic realities.
On this latter point, for instance, MPLA
was much more hostile to existing tradi-
tional tribal structures than UNITA.
Three kinds of issues have always
been troublesome to MPLA.Although they
are resolved in the sense of an "official
line," events such as the recent stoppage
by MPLA of a popular Luanda radio pro-
gram because it "inflamed" racial and
tribal antaqonisrn, and the protest that
followed, indicate that there are deep
difficulties ahead. The MPLA decision
in February to set up a party school and
to become more selective in allowing
membership in the MPLA, is another sign
of still-existing problems with internal
definition and structure.
MPLA's own overtures to South Africa,
with respect to the Cunene River hydro-
electric project, and to the United States
with respect to Cabinda oil, also under-
cuts some of its own criticism of UNITA.
The other side of this same political
question is the prospect for continued
military pressure in the form of guerrilla
activity waged by UNITA.Despite the dim
prospects of aid from either Zai reor Zam-
bia, it does seem possible for UNITA to
maintain the same level of harassing pres-
sure on MPLA that it maintained against
the Portuguese. UNITA's base area is also
Angola's "breadbasket." As the conven-
tional warfare winds down, guerrilla ac-
tivity may grow. Of potentially major sig-
nificance is mercenary involvement with
at least covert support from South Africa.
MPLA's task of consolidation thrusts to
the forefront the question of economic
organization. In Luanda, steps are being
taken that appear to be leading towards
worker control of factories. On the other
hand, Angola's oil and mineral wealth
places it on the target of multi-national
corporate interest. Coupled with MPLA's
urgent need for skilled manpower (de-
pleted by the fl ight of Portuguesesettlers),
developing Angola's resources poses the
dangerous and difficult task of balanc-
ing immediate needs with political
objectives.
Yet another question for the future is
the remaining struggle against white
rule in Southern Africa. The battle lines
are closing in on the. Republic of South
Africa. Zambia fears a political-military
thrust that disrupts its own "detente"
efforts with South Africa and Rhodesia.
Themotivating factor inZambia's concern
is economic necessity in terms of copper
exports and consumer imports, which
traditionally have been routed through
Angola and South Africa. Zaire to the
north fears a radical political entity, with
comparable material resources to itself,
as threatening to its perceived hegemony
over the independent African states in
the region; and like Zambia, is concerned
to moderate relations with South Africa.
The two immediate focuses of the
Southern Africa concern are: Namibia
and Rhodesia. Guerrilla activity in both
places is on the rise. The growth of cap-
italist penetration in "the white South,"
which has been rapid since themid 1960s
- based on the assumption that armed
political struggle by Africans was not
viable- is made insecure by a radically
nationalist Angola, which along with
Mozambique moves the battle lines 2000
miles nearer to South Africa. (See Com-
mentary, Pg. 10) 0
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